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Executive Summary
It is estimated that more than 500,000 people are killed each year with SALW.2 Violence and
conflict fueled by illicitly trafficked SALW impedes economic development, good governance
and human rights. 3 Studies have shown that illicit trafficking of weapons affects almost every
region of the world. 4 The UN 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All Its Aspects provides a unique opportunity to develop an international strategy
for addressing this serious threat. Most illicit SALW began as legal weapons and the diversion
of civilian weapons is one source of supply. Consequently, domestic regulation of SALW,
which reduces the diversion of legal civilian weapons to illegal markets, is an essential part
of this strategy.
The importance of effective domestic regulations in reducing the misuse and proliferation 
of SALW has been affirmed by the United Nations in several different contexts, including: 
the UN Security Council Resolution 1209 (1998); the Report of the Disarmament Commission
considered at the General Assembly (1999); and the Report of the UN Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice (1997).  These emphasise the importance of effective domestic
legislation in reducing the diversion and misuse of SALW.
Virtually every illegal small arm began as a legal small arm, whether in the hands of the state,
non-state actors, or civilians. Worldwide there are as many SALW in the hands of civilians as
in the hands of states. It is estimated that more than 500,000 of these are stolen each year5
and enter illegal markets. Indeed, in many regions of the world diversion from civilian supplies
is the principal source of illegal SALW.
There is a range of ways in which in civilian possession are diverted to illicit markets6 including
through:
l illegal manufacture and modification;
l illegal sales and transfers (primary, secondary via brokers);
l illegal resale and “straw purchases”;
l theft;
l diversion from surplus – (illegal or unwanted weapons); and
l falsification of documents and illegal importation (e.g. concealment).7
In addition, experience shows clearly that if surplus SALW are not removed from uncontrolled
circulation following conflict, levels of violence remain high, as interpersonal violence substitutes
for violence between warring factions.
The dimensions of illicit trafficking vary from region to region and only a fraction of incidents
are detected.  Relatively few countries systematically collect or analyse data on SALW which
are recovered by law enforcement officials.
In many conflict and post-conflict contexts, military assault weapons dominate illegal markets.
In other countries, such as South A f r i c a8 and Brazil,9 most of the weapons recovered are
handguns. A strategy to address illicit trafficking of “small arms” must therefore address
“firearms” because of the interactions between state and civilian markets, particularly where
pistols and revolvers are concerned. In this regard the International Consultation on the Illicit
Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons, 22-23 June 2000,
mandated by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), maintained that the OAU should focus
on a single accepted definition of SALW that meets the real needs of Africa. It proposed a
synthesis of the definition used by the UN Panel of Experts on Small Arms and that used in
the draft UN Firearm Protocol, suggesting that “firearm” be used instead to encompass the 
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full range of weapons. At the same time, it is also important that the UN Conference agree a
standard definition of “military assault rifle”. While these are only a small proportion of illicitly
trafficked SALW, they do need to be particularly tightly regulated.
Regulations on acquisition, possession, storage and use of SALW by civilians are critical
because these legal SALW “leak” to illegal markets. The same mechanisms used to divert
SALW in legal civilian markets to illicit markets within states in turn fuel international markets.
Countries where there is little effective regulation often play a major role in feeding the illicit
supply of SALW to countries where regulations may be more restrictive. In addition, the absence
of effective domestic regulation makes it difficult to distinguish licit from illicit SALW and to combat
trafficking in these weapons.
The objectives for the UN 2001 Conference relating to civilian supplies of SALW, should, 
in principle, be similar to the other key dimensions of the international action programme.
Therefore the Programme of Action should aim to achieve agreements at a high political
level that:
l Reinforce understanding of the linkages between licit, illicit, domestic and international
markets, and the need for a comprehensive and integrated strategy.
l Consolidate and strengthen international norms and standards regarding national regulation
of civilian possession of SALW, building on previous declarations of the UN General
Assembly and the UN Security Council, and the 1997 resolution of the UN Commission
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, while complementing (not duplicating) initiatives
under the Firearms Protocol to  the Convention on Transnational Organised Crime.
l Establish and strengthen international programmes to promote and support regional and
national initiatives aimed at strengthening regulation of civilian possession of SALW to reduce
illicit trafficking and misuse of these weapons.
l Establish follow-up processes including an annual review of the status of these initiatives
and ongoing support for data collection, information exchange and technical co-operation
in key areas.
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4Introduction
Small arms and light weapons have become the weapons of choice in conflicts around the world
and figure prominently in crime. Recently, considerable attention has been focused on the
proliferation of SALW at the national, regional and international level. The recognition that m o s t
illicit SALW began as legal weapons is, however, fundamental to efforts to reduce the proliferation
and misuse of SALW and the diversion of civilian weapons is one source of supply. Indeed, 
it is estimated that there are as many SALW in the hands of civilians worldwide as there are
in the possession of states, and that in many parts of the world diversion from civilian stocks
is the principal source of the illicit supply. Consequently, strengthening domestic regulation,
which reduces the diversion of legal weapons to illegal markets, is a critical part of any strategy
to address illicit trafficking. It is also consistent with resolutions from the United Nations
Security Council and other Commissions as well as regional initiatives. This briefing reviews
the ways in which SALW are diverted from legal to illegal markets and the measures which
can be used to reduce this diversion. In addressing illicit trafficking in all its aspects, it is
imperative that the UN Conference not does neglect this significant problem. 
5Civilian Markets: Licit/Illicit Links
Virtually every illegal small arm began as a legal small arm, whether in the hands of the
state, non-state actors, or civilians. Worldwide there are as many SALW in the hands of
civilians as in the hands of states. It is estimated that more than 500,000 of these are stolen
each year10 and enter illegal markets. Indeed, in many regions of the world diversion from
civilian supplies is the principal source of illegal SALW.
There is a range of ways in which SALW in civilian possession are diverted to illicit markets11
including through:
l illegal manufacture and modification;
l illegal sales and transfers (primary, secondary, via  brokers);
l illegal resale and “straw purchases”;
l theft;
l diversion from surplus – (illegal or unwanted weapons);
l falsification of documents and illegal importation (e.g. concealment).12
Illegal manufacture and modification
In general, illegally manufactured SALW are a small proportion of the problem of illicit traff i c k i n g ,
but they are a factor in some contexts. For example, of the SALW seized by the South A f r i c a n
Police Service in 1998, approximately 15 per cent were home-made.1 3 In some cases, the illegal
or unauthorised manufacture of weapons is facilitated by the use of components that have
been imported or stolen. The domestic manufacture and assembly of SALW from imported parts,
for example, is cited as a major source of illicit weapons in Australia. Arelated problem is posed
by the reactivation of SALW that were legally owned at one time but that have been deactivated
because of a change in laws.14 Regulation of the SALW that may be held legally by civilians
assists in detecting and deterring illegal production.
Illegal sales by legal dealers
At each point in the distribution chain there are opportunities for diversion. Sometimes SALW
are sold illegally by licensed dealers, indeed a large percentage of illegal weapons may stem
from a small number of “dirty” dealers. For example, in the United States, more than half of
the weapons traced by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) originated with
fewer than 900 (0.5 percent) of the 180,000 licensed dealers in the United States.15 In some
cases, dishonest SALW dealers have engaged in the legal SALW trade while diverting some
of their SALW to illicit markets. 16 Other cases of this type have been identified by major police
investigations such as Operation ABONAR in the United Kingdom.17 Regulation of dealers
and sales assist in reducing the likelihood that weapons will be sold illegally.
A View from Brazil
B r a z i l ’s rates of firearm homicide are comparable to those of South Africa, 25.7 per 100,000, more
t h a n 40,000 people per year. According to a recent analysis of guns recovered in Rio de Janeiro
during 1994-99, the vast majority of firearms recovered are revolvers (73%) and pistols (15.6%).
The majority of the firearms recovered (83%) are Brazilian made and many of them appear to have
been exported and illegally re-imported although the lack of information makes this difficult to assess.
Approximately 2.5% of the firearms were made in Argentina and 6.7% were made in the United States.
Again the routes by which these reach the illegal market are not always clear.1 8 Paraguay is believed
to be a major conduit for guns entering.
Methods
of diversion
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Illegal resale and “straw purchases”
Small arms and light weapons that are bought legally and then sold or given to a second
owner are a problem in many countries, particularly in those which do not regulate resale 
or secondary markets, such as gun shows. Within the United States, “straw purchases” 
– where a gun is purchased legally and sold illegally – are the principal means used to move
guns from legal to illegal markets.20 The same mechanisms are often used to supply SALW t o
illegal markets in Canada2 1 and Mexico.2 2 While there is limited empirical data on the extent o f
this problem globally, in Canada, more than half the handguns recovered in crime are
illegally imported, and straw purchases in the United States are one of the principal means
by which SALW enter the illegal market.2 3 Gun shows, which are largely unregulated, have also
proved to be a major source of illicit guns to international illegal markets.2 4 Regulating secondary
sales is therefore essential in order to reduce opportunities for diversion.
Theft
Governments participating in the UN International Study on Firearm Regulation reported more
than 100,000 SALW lost or stolen annually. According to the UN study, the United States
reported more than 12,000 stolen guns during a nine-month period to September 1996.
However, other sources have estimated that the number could be as high as half a million.25
South Africa reported nearly 17,500 guns stolen annually to the UN study; more recent studies
indicate that the figure is at least twice this.2 6 Stolen guns travel globally. In Uruguay, for example,
officials recovered 156 9mm pistols and 15 machine guns that had been stolen in Poland.27
Diversion from surplus – illegal, unwanted weapons
Just as weapons left over from conflicts have been diverted, weapons collected in amnesties,
as well as those recovered in crime, may flow back into the illegal market if they are not
destroyed. For example, over 3,000 firearms recovered in crime or surrendered in amnesties
to the Toronto Metropolitan Police Service in Canada were illegally sold by officers and civilians
working in the unit. 28 Destruction of these weapons thus reduces opportunities for diversion.
Illegal importation – concealment and false declarations
The main mechanisms for moving illegal weapons from one country to another are concealment,
false declaration, falsification of documents and mail order.29 The Organisation of American
States (OAS) agreement and the proposed UN Firearms Protocol is designed to reduce this
form of diversion. By improving the tracking of legal SALW, these initiatives are intended to reduce
the opportunities for diversion, to improve enforcement of laws against illicit trafficking, and 
to help deter criminal activity.30
Arms
recovered –
Rio de Janeiro
(Enero de
1994 – Marzo
de 1999)19
Type Number % of Total
Revólver 32,469 73.1
Pistola 6,916 15.6
Espingarda 2,505 5.6
Metralleta 1,835 1.9
Fusil, Rifle y Carabina 1,707 3.8
Bazooka y Lanza Granada #,005 0.01
Total de armas 44,437 100
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A View from Southern Africa
Criminal violence dwarfs political conflict as a cause of death in South A f r i c a .3 5 Not only does violence
impede economic development, but it has been called the greatest threat to human rights in the
young democracy. There are three main sources of illegal SALW in South Africa: post-conflict
weapons; weapons diverted from state sources, including the police; and weapons diverted from
legal civilian markets. Efforts by the South African Police Service to track the supply of SALW
recovered in crime are relatively recent, but they do not support claims regarding the prevalence
of post-conflict military weapons.3 6 R a t h e r, military assault rifles represent a small proportion of guns
used in crime or murder in recent years. There were 12,298 murders with firearms in South Africa
in 1998. Handguns accounted for 57% of these, commercial rifles or shotguns 24.8%, military SALW
2.8% and 15%.37 This pattern holds for the SALW recovered in crime as well: in 1998 only 500 
of 21,000 firearms recovered in crime were AK-47s. The effects of this illegal SALW market are seen
in the surrounding region. As Botswana’s Police Commissioner, Normal Moleboge noted, “rightly or
wrongly we believe these weapons come across the border from South Africa. I personally believe
they have very liberal laws in South Africa, which are not as stringent as ours. We collect a lot 
of firearms in the South Africa-Botswana border. It doesn’t occur to some visitors to leave their
gun behind when they visit our country.”38
AView from Central America
Although the illicit sale, use and trafficking of SALW constitutes a major social problem throughout
Central America, there is relatively little reliable information on the subject. Estimates on the number
of illegal weapons in the hands of civilians range from two million for the entire region to two million
in Guatemala alone. 31 What is clear is that the impact of this illicit arsenal of SALW on the region
has been devastating. The homicide rate in the region is approaching 60 per 100,000 population,
or almost double the average for the rest of the Americas.32 In Honduras, an opinion poll carried
out in 1998 and 1999 showed that violence and crime were overwhelmingly considered to be the
greatest problems facing the country – 16 points ahead of the devastation wrought by hurricane Mitch.3 3
The sources for the weapons that contribute to these alarming levels of insecurity are myriad.
The hundreds of thousands of small arms, grenades and assault rifles transferred to the region
during the years of civil conflict continue to circulate. Of these, AK-47 and M16 assault rifles and
RPG 7 pistols appear to predominate. In addition, large quantities of SALW continue to be imported
into the region; twenty million dollars worth between 1997 and 2000 in El Salvador alone.3 4 There is
also a small but significant cottage industry involved in the illegal manufacture of small arms in some
urban centres. In addition to the large illicit market created by this surplus within the region,
significant illicit channels have emerged to supply these weapons to international organised crime
and civil conflict in neighbouring countries.
7
Methods
of diversion
8Civilian Markets: Licit/Illicit Links
The Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes
In many regions, there is limited empirical information about the types and sources of SALW 
but in many areas, the arms recovered in crime have flowed from post-conflict weapon stocks.
For example, at a meeting of senior police officers, the assistant commissioner Ole Mpesha,
Firearms Licensing Off i c e r, Kenya, noted that the number of SALW recovered had increased 
in recent years and that most of these SALW were AK-47s. Although the SALW recovered
represent only a fraction of illegal SALW in circulation and changes are affected by enforcement,
the numbers of AK-47s recovered have tended to increase over the past 5 years: 214 in 1994,
430 in 1996, 755 in 1997, 1476 in 1998, and 676 in 1999.
Firearms
seized by the
South African
Police Service
1994-199839
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Rifles
AK-47 rifles 1,589 1,392 1,169 803 527
Nagant, R1, R4, R5, LM4, LM5 237 345 283 225 342
Carbines 28 18 28 54 203
Submachine guns 45 256 202 53 56
Other rifles 1,297 892 963 898 964
Shotguns 692 632 599 647 741
Pistols
Machine pistols 27 125 353 225 305
Makarov and Tokarev 220 230 484 382 317
Other non-machine pistols 5,160 6,934 8,455 6,457 10,899
Revolvers 2,370 2,842 2,812 2,272 3,282
Home made firearms 3,124 2,624 2,806 2,954 2,066
All 14,789 16,290 18,154 14,970 20,702
Methods
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While some countries simply ban civilian possession of all SALW and others prohibit certain
types (for example military-style assault rifles), most countries allow civilian possession under
certain circumstances for specific purposes. Efforts to regulate civilian possession of SALW
are based on the notion that by imposing some regulations and restrictions on the licit possession
and use of SALW, it is possible to reduce the risk of misuse and diversion to illegal markets.
To a certain extent, this has been recognized.
UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime 
– The Firearms Protocol
While its focus is on the misuse of firearms by organised crime, the proposed UN Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Commission Draft Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing
of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, also focuses on
ensuring adequate control, marking, transparency and record-keeping, and enforcement
measures relating to the import, export and in-transit shipment of commercial shipments of
firearms. The proposed system will require countries to provide authorisation to one another
before allowing commercial shipments of firearms to leave, enter or move across their territory.
By improving the marking and tracking of legal firearms, these measures are intended to reduce
the opportunities for diversion, to improve enforcement of laws against illicit trafficking, and 
to help deter criminal activity.4 0 E fforts to regulate SALW and reduce illicit trafficking and misuse
rest, in large part, on the ability to track individual weapons.
The Firearms Protocol focuses only on commercial shipments and does not address 
state-to-state transfers or the movements of SALW within countries. Given that SALW
manufacturers often serve both commercial and military markets,41 co-ordination of efforts 
to develop international standards for marking all weapons, including unique identifiers and
record-keeping, are essential.
UN Security Council
The UN Security Council Resolution 1209, adopted 19 November 1998,42 reflected concerns
with the destabilising effects of SALW in sub-Saharan Africa and the importance of stemming
illicit flows. The resolution:
“2. Encourages African States to enact legislation on the domestic possession and use 
of arms, including the establishment of national legal and judicial mechanisms for the
effective implementation of such laws, and to implement effective import, export and 
re-export controls, and encourages, also, the international community, in consultation 
with African States, to assist in these efforts.”
Clearly, the same principles that have been suggested for the African continent to reduce
illicit trafficking of SALW apply in other contexts as well.
The Role of Domestic Regulation
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United Nations General Assembly
– Report of the Disarmament Commission
The report of the UN Disarmament Commission, reviewed at the UN General Assembly 
in December 1999, reinforces the importance of national measures including appropriate
domestic legislation.43 Specifically, it says:
“36. States should work towards the introduction of appropriate national legislation,
administrative regulations and licensing requirements that define the conditions under
which firearms can be acquired, used and traded by private persons. In particular they
should consider the prohibition of the unrestricted trade and private ownership of SALW
specifically designed for military purposes, such as automatic guns (e.g. assault rifles 
and machine guns).”
The report also emphasises the importance of marking weapons to assist national law
enforcement agencies in combating illicit arms trafficking.
UN Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Resolution
The United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice has recognised
the need for these efforts in its resolution of 1997. At the May 1997 meeting of the UN Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Commission, a resolution sponsored by 33 countries was
endorsed which explicitly linked access to SALW to death and injury, and acknowledged the
important role of domestic legislation in controlling the flow of guns from less-regulated to
more-regulated areas.44 The resolution “Requests the Secretary-General to promote, within
existing resources, technical co-operation projects that recognize the relevance of small arm
regulation in addressing violence against women, in promoting justice for victims of crime
and in addressing the problem of children and youth as victims and perpetrators of crime 
and in re-establishing or strengthening the rule of law in post-conflict peace-keeping projects.”
Specifically, it:
“5. Encourages Member States to consider, where they have not yet done so, regulatory
approaches to the civilian use of firearms that include the following common elements:
(a) Regulations relating to firearm safety and storage;
(b) Appropriate penalties and/or administrative sanctions for offences involving the
misuse or unlawful possession of firearms;
(c) Mitigation of, or exemption from, criminal responsibility, amnesty or similar programmes
that individual Member States determine to be appropriate to encourage citizens 
to surrender illegal, unsafe or unwanted firearms;
(d) A licensing system, inter alia, including the licensing of firearm businesses, to ensure
that firearms are not distributed to persons convicted of serious crimes or other persons
who are prohibited under the laws of respective Member States from owning or
possessing firearms;
(e) Arecord-keeping system for firearms, inter alia, including a system for the commercial
distribution of firearms and a requirement for appropriate marking of firearms at
manufacture and at import, to assist criminal investigations, discourage theft and
ensure that firearms are distributed only to persons who may lawfully own or possess
firearms under the laws of the respective Member States.”
The Role of Domestic Regulation
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The Role of Domestic Regulation
While the Firearms Protocol, which has been under negotiation as part of the UN
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, addresses recommendation 5(e), there has
been little attention paid on an international or even regional basis to the other elements.
Implementations of these recommendations would not only improve the safety of citizens
within their borders, but also would reduce illicit trafficking between states. It goes without
saying that the laws alone are not enough. It is also essential to develop the capacity to
implement and enforce those laws in a transparent fashion.
Universal Declaration on Human Rights
While rights for legitimate national security, self determination, and national sovereignty have
been reaffirmed several times, there is no evidence of a general right to unrestricted civilian
access to arms under any international human rights instrument.4 5 Even within the United States,
where constitutional claims of the civilian right to bear arms are often invoked, courts repeatedly
and unanimously have maintained that the US Constitution does not guarantee individuals
the right to possess or carry guns; the Second Amendment protects only the right of the states
to maintain organised military forces. It does not impede local, state, or national legislatures
from enacting or enforcing gun control laws. Many other jurisdictions, including in South A f r i c a ,
the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada, have explicitly rejected the notion that such
a right exists. Indeed it has been argued that the right to life, liberty and security of the person
under Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights supports efforts to reduce
access to arms.
Some countries virtually prohibit civilian possession of SALW. Many allow civilian possession for
such purposes as hunting, sport or pest control. Such regulations also make it easier to enforce
laws against illicit trafficking and possession: what is “legal” is clearly defined in terms of licensing,
registration and safe storage, therefore it is much easier to define what is “illegal”.
Countries in both the North and the South have emphasised the importance of strengthening
domestic regulation as part of the international strategy to reduce illicit trafficking and misuse
of SALW.4 6 Restrictions on SALW possession and ownership are not the sole province of
developed countries, however. The United Nations, through the Commission on Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice (which operates under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council),
has undertaken a study of the extent of such regulation in member countries.47 Of the initial
respondents, which included 22 high-income and 24 developing countries, the majority 
(39 of those 46 countries) required licensing of all firearms and purchases, and another six
required licensing for at least some firearms.48 A significant majority also require registration 
of firearms and there are safe storage regulations in approximately three-quarters of responding
countries. Since this initial survey, more than half of the participating nations have reported that
they have recently amended their legislation and administration of civilian firearms ownership.
A summary of the legislation in high-income countries along with estimated rates of firearm
ownership and intentional firearm death rates is contained below. While other factors are
important, it should be noted that intentional firearm death rates in high-income countries
tend to vary with levels of firearm ownership.49
Some of the key features of typical domestic legislation that are relevant to efforts to
reducing illicit trafficking are outlined below.
1 1
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Controlling sales
Regulating firearm dealers and imposing record-keeping requirements reduces the likelihood
that SALW will be sold to unlicensed individuals or on the illegal market. Many countries impose
rigorous standards for individuals wishing to engage in the SALW trade, including both initial
and subsequent sales. Indeed, some do not allow transfers unless they are made through
authorised dealers. Controls on sales not only prevent diversion, but also aid law enforcement
efforts to trace the source of illicit SALW and to prosecute traffickers. Efforts to increase the
standards for licensing firearm dealers have been shown to have a significant effect on the
illegal gun trade.
Licensing possession
The aim of licensing is to authorise certain individuals to legally use and possess SALW, 
and to reduce the risk that SALW will be misused or diverted. The licensing process also
provides information about who owns SALW, thereby improving accountability and supporting
enforcement. Different countries impose different standards on those who wish to possess SALW,
ranging from simple criminal record checks to more detailed screening, including reference
checks and requirements to demonstrate legitimate “need”. Often the standards vary depending
on the type of small arm. Most countries, for example, have extremely strict controls on handguns
and fewer restrictions on hunting rifles. Very few countries allow civilians to carry handguns
and generally regulate, precisely, the conditions under which handguns may be transported.
In general, the more rigorous the standards and enforcement of licensing, the more difficult 
it is to divert legally possessed SALW. Licensing lawful possession of SALW also aids in the
detection and prosecution of illicit traffickers by clearly defining who may possess SALW
under what circumstances.
Registration and record-keeping
Registering SALW requires the maintenance of information about the SALW owned by an
individual. The aim is to improve accountability and reduce the likelihood that SALW will be
diverted to unauthorised individuals. Maintaining records about individual SALW at each stage
in the distribution chain also supports law enforcement by allowing illicit SALW to be tracked
to their source. Most industrialised countries and many others already register SALW in civilian
possession. Many are improving their record-keeping systems to support improved access 
to this information. High standards of marking, including unique identifiers, are important 
to aiding accurate registration.
Safe storage
Safe storage regulations are intended to reduce unauthorised access, impulsive use and
theft of SALW. Often the standards are different for different classes of SALW. In most countries,
safe storage requirements preclude ready access to SALW for “self-protection” although often
exceptions are made for predator control in rural areas. Standards for safe storage should
include storing the small arm in secure locked containers separate from the ammunition.
Controls on ammunition
Controls on ammunition are intended to reduce the likelihood that an illegally obtained small
arm can be used. Although ammunition can be made relatively easily, many countries have
strict controls over the purchase and possession of ammunition.
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legislation Prohibiting civilian possession of some weapons
Some countries have banned possession of certain types of weapons by civilians. For example
the UK banned possession of handguns in 1997 and instituted a buy-back programme to remove
them from circulation. The types of weapons which civilians may possess vary from country
to country depending on the context, but most countries prohibit civilian possession of military
assault weapons. Military assault weapons are not designed for hunting, target shooting or
controlling predators on farms. Military assault weapons are designed to kill and maim
multiple victims quickly and easily with much less skill than is required, for example, to use 
a high-precision hunting rifle. Considerable research has been undertaken regarding the
particular risks posed by these weapons in terms of lethality.5 0 Studies have shown that
where they are available they tend to account for a disproportionate percentage of weapons
used in crime. However, the definitions of military assault weapons vary, even within countries.
Some, for example, classify only fully automatic weapons as military, others include semi-
automatic variants. In terms of regulation, some countries have prohibited importation but 
not possession; some have prohibitions based on manufacturer and model. Others prohibit
based on characteristics because of the tendency for manufacturers to re-brand. While many
countries have different standards regarding the SALW they consider to have legitimate
purposes for civilian possession, there is an emerging consensus in favour of banning the
civilian sale and possession of military weapons.
Amnesties, buy-backs and collection programmes
Amnesties, buy-backs and collection programmes have been used to removed surplus or illicit
SALW from circulation with mixed success. In the case of Great Britain and Australia these
types of programmes have accompanied changes in the law which made certain weapons
illegal after a given point in time. Compensation was given to those who surrendered weapons
and severe penalties were imposed on those who retained the weapons. In these cases, the
buy-backs required a significant investment but also yielded large quantities of SALW – more
than 500,000 in the case of Australia. While many agree that removing illegal and unneeded
S A LW from circulation is desirable, research suggests that the impact of various weapon
collections programmes, buy-backs and amnesties on the supply of illicit SALW has been uneven,
at best. The factors affecting their effectiveness have been the subject of much discussion.51
Enforcement and capacity building
The experience of the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Interpol suggests
that detailed analysis of data has proved invaluable to criminal investigations and to identifying
“hot spots”. Improved exchange of information among police agencies is considered critical
to addressing the problem on an international level. Increased information sharing among
intelligence, customs, police and other law enforcement agencies and/or information exchange
regarding sensitive end users is essential. Co-operation between intelligence and enforcement
agencies in countries of source, destination and transit assists in the monitoring and countering
the activities of traffickers, suspect brokers and potential unlawful end-users. However, many
countries simply lack the capacity to effectively enforce the law. To this end, capacity building
is critical if such efforts are to succeed.52
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Strengthening Domestic Legislation in Southern Africa
South Africa has recently passed new domestic legislation strengthening licensing requirements,
reducing the number of SALW an individual may possess, and closing loopholes identified in the
existing legislation. Other countries in the region have strict domestic laws. Botswana, for example,
presently has a total prohibition on issuing handgun licensed to individuals. Namibia’s domestic
firearms policy allows licenses to be issued for up to four firearms, all of which are registered;
owners must be finger-printed and a photograph issued with the license. Lesotho’s Internal Security
Arms and Ammunition Act requires firearms owners to be licensed and registration certificates 
to be issued by local police, rifles were banned in 1999. Malawi’s Firearm’s Act allows annual
firearms licenses to be issued. 
Mozambique’s domestic firearms legislation was created with the Regulamento de Armas e
Municoes of 1973 and also requires that all firearms owners be licensed. Each license must be
individually confirmed by the Minister of the Interior and accompanied by letters explaining the
need for the firearm. Applicants are fingerprinted and ownership is restricted to three hunting rifles
and one handgun per person. It is estimated that there are only about 3,000 legal firearm owners
in the country.
The Antigua Declaration, 2000
Participants at an NGO-organised conference of July 2000 in Antigua, Guatemala55 underlined 
the importance of effective domestic legislation in combating these problems, and called on their
governments to: 
l Harmonise national legislation with regard to the control, registration, traffic, commercialisation,
ownership and possession of weapons and munitions in the most restrictive manner possible,
and bring these into line with existing norms;
l Promote the incorporation of the control of the legal trade in arms and ammunition in the
action plans of those national, regional and international organisations which deal exclusively
with control on the illegal trade in such materials; and 
l Consider the implementation of a moratorium on the export and import of all weapons to and from
the Central American region, similar to that which now exists among the Economic Community
of West African States.
The Nairobi Declaration, 2000
The Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region has identified domestic regulation and legislation and
policing as priorities to counter the proliferation of SALW. In a sub-regional meeting in Kampala on
31 January-1 February 2000, it was clearly identified that the countries represented should review
and update firearm legislation.5 3 The purpose of the review would be to harmonise regulations
governing the possession, use, import, export and transit in SALW, at the sub-regional level, and
to further develop a sub-regional treaty or convention on these issues. The Nairobi Declaration 
of 15 March, 2000 fully supports domestic controls and the adoption of national laws, regulations
and control mechanisms to govern civilian possession of arms.5 4 Acomprehensive implementation
plan was developed by governmental experts and NGOs in Nairobi on 6-8 November 2000. 
The plan established a sub-regional secretariat and national focal points to assist in the development
of national priorities and to ensure harmonisation at the sub-regional level. 
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While much discussion of the effects of illicit SALW trafficking has tended to focus on areas
in the South, the reality is that many regions in the North are also affected. As national border
controls are eroded, there is also evidence that these weapons are a growing concern in many
nations both in the context of crime and political conflicts. States which establish strict controls
on civilian possession of SALW are still vulnerable to weapons illegally imported from other
states. For example, in countries with relatively strict domestic legislation, such as Mexico,
Jamaica, Canada and Japan, most of the SALW recovered in crime are illegally imported. 
In Canada, studies undertaken in 1995 and 1997 in a number of jurisdictions revealed that
the SALW most often recovered in crime were rifles and shotguns, most of which originated
in domestic markets, 58 and that, overall, about 20 percent of the SALW recovered in crime
are handguns. However, of the handguns recovered in crime in major cities such as Toronto, 
it is estimated that over half originate in the United States and are smuggled into Canada
using many of the same techniques that are used to divert legal SALW to illegal markets 
in the United States, particularly straw purchases and gun show sales. Military-style assault
weapons which, along with sawn-off shotguns, are prohibited weapons account for fewer than
three percent of SALW recovered. The routes by which SALW reach Japan are circuitous,
however, most of the seized SALW are handguns of which 32.6 % are manufactured in the
United States and 20.9% are manufactured in China.59
Strengthening Domestic Legislation in Southern Africa (cont’d)
Swaziland’s Arms and Ammunition Act no. 24 of 1964 requires that licenses to possess firearms
and purchase ammunition be renewed annually. Tanzania’s Arms and Ammunition Act of 1991
sets out strict processes for acquiring firearms licenses. Zambia’s Firearms Act of 1969 requires
both licensing and registration and restricts ownership to individuals of 21 years and older.
Z i m b a b w e ’s Firearms Act of 1957 also requires a firearms certificate for persons over the age of 16.5 6
Both the Southern Africa Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Tr a fficking 
(of May 1998 57) and the OAU International Consultation on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation 
and Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons of June 2000, emphasised the importance 
of strengthening and harmonising laws and regulations governing the possession, use and
transfer of SALW. The latter also suggested that a single and accepted definition synthesising 
the definition used by the UN Panel of Experts on Small Arms and the Firearms Protocol 
be developed for SALW.
1 5
National
legislation
Current
approaches
The Role of Domestic Regulation
A number of international and regional agreements such as the OAS Convention and the 
UN Firearms Protocol address critical aspects of the commercial SALW market and provide
international standards for import/export/in transit and marking of these shipments in order 
to reduce possibilities for diversion. Other international agreements and declarations emphasise
the importance of regulating the civilian sale, possession, storage and use of SALW in order
to prevent illicit trafficking and to facilitate post-conflict development. However, since there are
a range of ways in which legal civilian SALW can be diverted to illegal markets, regulations
must address every step of the life-cycle of a firearm: initial and subsequent sales must be
regulated to reduce the risk of diversion; possession of SALW (and ammunition) should be
licensed to reduce the risk of diversion and misuse, and to improve accountability; registration
of individual weapons coupled with record-keeping is necessary to reduce illegal sales, and
to increase transparency and accountability of civilian owners; storage should be regulated to
reduce the risks of theft and unauthorised access; particular types of weapons ought to be
prohibited altogether, particularly where the risk is considered to outweigh the utility; amnesty
programmes, buy-backs and collection are useful for removing surplus civilian weapons from
circulation and are most effective when accompanied with destruction programmes; whilst
targeted enforcement, technical cooperation and sharing of best practices are ways of
supporting effective implementation.
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Country Licensing Registration Other Households Gun Gun Total
of of all with Homicide Suicide Intentional
Owners? Firearms? firearms (per (per (per
(%) 100,000) 100,000) 100,000)
Japan Yes Yes Prohibits handguns 0.6 0.03 0.04 0.07
with few exceptions
Taiwan N/A N/A N/A 0.15 0.12 0.27
Singapore Yes Yes Most handguns and 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.24
rifles prohibited (795 in the
country)
Kuwait N/A N/A N/A 0.34 0.03 0.37
Netherlands Yes Yes 1.9 0.27 0.28 0.55
England/Wales Yes Yes Prohibits handguns 4.0 0.07 0.33 0.4
Scotland Yes Yes Identical legislation 4.0 0.19 0.30 0.49
to England and Wales 
though made 
separately
Ireland Yes Yes Severely restricts N/A 0.30 0.94 1.24
handguns
Denmark Yes For long guns 8 0.23 2.25 2.48
Northern Ireland Yes Yes UK legislation applies 8.4 3.55 1.18 4.72
except for right 
to possess for 
self defence
Germany Yes Yes 8.9 0.21 1.23 1.44
Spain Yes Yes Some handguns 13.1 0.19 0.55 0.74
and rifles 
are prohibited
Austria Yes All 8 states Banned semiautomatics 16.0 0.56 2.38 2.94
after 1997 unless good reason 
shown
Belgium For certain Yes Some rifles 16.5 0.87 2.45 3.32
types are prohibited
Sweden Yes Yes Restrictions in some 20 0.18 2.09 2.27
regions
New Zealand Yes Handguns only. 20 0.22 2.45 2.67
Proposed for 
long guns
France Yes Yes, except 22.6 0.55 4.93 5.48
for selected 
sporting rifles
Canada Yes Handguns Automatic, converted 26 0.60 3.35 3.95
only, all guns and semi-automatic
by 2003 assault weapons 
and some handguns
Italy Yes Yes N/A 1.16 1.11 2.27
Switzerland Yes Yes 27.2 0.46 5.74 6.2
Israel Yes Yes N/A 0.72 1.84 2.56
Norway Yes Unknown 32 0.36 3.87 4.23
USA In some Handguns in Some weapons in 41 6.24 7.23 13.47
States some States some States
Finland Yes Yes No prohibitions 5061 0.87 5.78 6.65
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Objectives
Definitions
The importance of effective domestic legislation in reducing illicit trafficking of SALW must 
not be ignored. The UN 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light We a p o n s
in All its Aspects must, almost by definition, consider the ways in which civilian supplies of SALW
are diverted to illicit markets and ways of reducing this diversion.
The objectives for the UN 2001 Conference relating to civilian supplies of SALW should, 
in principle, be similar to the other key dimensions of the international Programme of Action.
It should therefore aim to achieve agreements at a high political level that:
l Reinforce understanding of the linkages between licit, illicit, domestic and international
markets and the need for a comprehensive and integrated strategy.
l Consolidate and strengthen international norms and standards regarding national regulation
of civilian possession of SALW, building on previous declarations of the UN General A s s e m b l y
and the UN Security Council, and the 1997 resolution of the UN Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice, while complementing (not duplicating) initiatives under
the Firearms Protocol to the Convention on Transnational Organised Crime.
l Establish and strengthen international programmes to promote and support regional and
national initiatives aimed at strengthening regulation of civilian possession of SALW to reduce
illicit trafficking and misuse of these weapons.
l Establish follow-up processes including an annual review of the status of these initiatives
and ongoing support for data collection, information exchange and technical co-operation
in key areas.
A strategy to address illicit trafficking of “small arms” must also address “firearms” because 
of the interactions between these markets and the fact that the delineation of “state” versus
“civilian” markets is by no means clear. For example, as mentioned above, the OAU International
Consultation on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Tr a fficking in Small Arms and Light
Weapons maintained that the Organisation should focus on a single accepted definition of
S A LW based upon a synthesis of the definition used by the UN Panel on Small Arms and
that used in the draft Firearm Protocol, suggesting that “firearm” be used instead to encompass
the full range of these.
Recognising that further work may be needed to refine the definitions, rather than debating
the semantic issues, the Programme of Action should:
l Use a single accepted definition of SALW that addresses the requirements of combating
the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects, and reflects the realities of SALW- a ffected regions
such as Africa. For these purposes, the terms “small arm” and “firearm” are, in effect,
synonymous, and include: “revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines;
submachine guns; assault rifles; light machine guns”62 regardless of their intended use
(military, police, civilian).
l Specifically define “military assault rifles, for example, as “light machine guns, submachine
guns, fully automatic, or selective-fire rifles with characteristics, which may include, but are
not limited to, large-capacity magazines, folding stocks and bayonet mounts, and are
intended for combat purposes rather than hunting.”
l Ensure a high level of coordination and consistency be maintained among various UN
initiatives such as the Firearms Protocol, particularly with respect to import/export/transit
and brokering, standards for marking, and standards for record-keeping, to ensure that 
all SALW, whether directed at military, police or civilian markets, are subject to rigorous
controls, in order to prevent illicit trafficking.
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Marking 
and tracing
Regulation 
of civilian
possession
Clearly, successful completion of the adoption, ratification and implementation of the UN
Firearms Protocol as part of the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime is critical
to addressing the problem of illicit SALW trafficking. International legally binding standards for
marking commercial shipments of SALW should be implemented. States should make a priority
the conclusion of these negotiations and the development of compatible standards for the
marking of other shipments of SALW. As stated,6 3 whether it is successfully negotiated 
within the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime or elsewhere, it is critical that this
marking standard:
l Require at manufacture the marking of SALW and components to identify the manufacturer,
place of manufacture, and unique identifier or serial number for every weapon, according
to an internationally recognised standard.
l Require adequate record-keeping, allowing the tracing of these weapons and components
at every stage in their life-cycle (wholesale, import/export/in transit, initial sale, secondary
sale, possession, destruction).
l Prevent the manufacture, import, export or transhipment, sale or possession of unmarked
SALW and components.
l Develop standards for re-marking at import/export/transit, sale and possession, 
where necessary.
l Reinforce co-operation with other states and with relevant intergovernmental
organisations in the tracing of illicit or suspect SALW, components and ammunition.
Encourage national and regional efforts
The regulation of civilian possession of  SALW is critical to international efforts to combat
illicit trafficking in all its aspects and is consistent with a number of resolutions by the General
Assembly and the Security Council. Therefore, the Programme of Action should:
l Encourage and support regional initiatives aimed at improving the standards for domestic
regulation of civilian possession and sale of SALW, and at harmonising approaches to
civilian regulation.
l Encourage and support the implementation of national initiatives to regulate civilian access
to SALW as outlined in the 1997 Resolution of the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice Commission. 
National legislation to regulate possession of SALW
The Programme of Action should encourage and support the implementation of national
legislation by states which licenses the possession and sale of SALW to civilians, including
requirements which:
l Confirm the identity of the licensees.
l Define the conditions under which persons may own or possess SALW by law.
l Establish standards that prevent persons convicted of serious crimes or who are prohibited
by law from owning SALW.
l Maintain records of civilian small arm/firearm owners.
Opportunities for the UN 2001 Conference
Regulation 
of civilian
possession
Prohibit
civilian
possession 
of military
assault
weapons
National legislation to licence dealers and sellers
of SALW
The Programme of Action should encourage and support states which have not done so 
in implementing national legislation that regulates initial and subsequent sale of to civilians,
including requirements that: 
l Licence dealers to ensure that SALW are not distributed to persons convicted of serious crime
or persons prohibited under the laws of states from owning or possessing SALW.
l Regulate initial sale and resale of SALW components and ammunition.
l Require records to be maintained of initial sales and re-sales of SALW.
A record keeping systems for all SALW
The Programme of Action should:
l Encourage and support states which have not done so in implementing national legislation
to ensure accurate and accessible records are maintained of a) the SALW sold (including
initial sales and re-sales), as well as b) the business or individual to which they are sold,
in order to discourage theft and ensure that SALW are distributed only to persons who may
lawfully own or possess SALW under the laws of respective states.
l Encourage and support regions and national governments in establishing regulations 
to address the problems of unmarked SALW and those without unique serial numbers, 
in order to ensure that adequate and accessible records may be maintained.
Safe storage requirements
Theft from civilian sellers and possessors of SALW is a major source fuelling the international
illicit supply. Standards for safe storage should be designed to reduce the risk of theft and
increase the accountability of those in possession of SALW.  The programme of action should:
l Encourage the development of national laws regulating civilian possession and storage 
of SALW and ammunition to reduce the risks of diversion.
Efforts should be made to establish a norm of non-possession of military assault weapons 
by civilians. In order to do this, the Programme of Action should:
l Establish an internationally accepted definition of military assault weapons not appropriate
for civilian possession (see above).
l Encourage the development of national laws prohibition of the sale to, or possession by,
civilians of these military assault weapons.
l Prioritise collection and destruction of military assault weapons in civilian possession.
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The Programme of Action should require states to:
l Establish appropriate penalties and/or administrative sanctions for offences involving the
misuse or unlawful possession or trafficking of SALW.
l Establish appropriate penalties and/or administrative sanctions for offences involving the
unlawful trade or possession of unmarked or unregistered SALW.
l Prioritise enforcement needed to promote compliance, and support the detection and
prosecution of illicit trafficking.
l Develop capacity to support timely, confidential reporting and information sharing among
international, regional and national policing agencies regarding incidents and
investigations of illicit trafficking, in order to improve detection, investigation and
prosecution of offences.
l Develop amnesty programs to promote the collection and destruction of illegal, unwanted
and surplus civilian weapons.
The Programme of Action should establish a full range of follow-up measures to strengthen
global, regional and national capacity to combat illicit trafficking among relevant agencies 
and stakeholders. These should include the police, customs, border guards, the justice system
and civil society. Many states have the will but need support in order to implement these
recommendations. The Programme of Action should establish mechanisms to:
l Assist national governments in identifying training requirements, facilities and
programmes to ensure police, customs, border guards and others have the skills 
and tools needed to address the problem of illicit trafficking.
l Assist national governments in improving record-keeping systems and in developing
technology needed to improve collection, analysis and sharing of information.
l Encourage countries to establish uniform standards for data collection and reporting
regarding SALW used and recovered in crime and violence.
l Share new technological approaches to record-keeping, tracing and destruction.
l Encourage countries to collect information regarding illicit trafficking in their area and 
to provide Interpol with regular updates for the International Weapons and Explosives
Tracking System (IWETS), in order to facilitate cooperation and monitoring of the 
global problem.
l Establish programmes to provide human, technical and financial resources needed.
l Develop collaborative approaches with civil society to promote research, education and
public awareness and effective implementation of these measures.
Enforcement
Technical
support and
cooperation
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Follow up
mechanisms
Research and
information
exchange
Information is critical to effective development and implementation of the Programme of A c t i o n .
Consequently, it should:
l In consultation with the appropriate intergovernmental agencies as well as research institutes
and other NGOs, establish uniform standards and approaches to collect national data on
SALW trafficking, misuse and approaches to regulation, and coordinate collection of this
information in order to provide an annual or bi-annual update. This update would include:
data regarding crime, death and injury; new and emerging approaches to regulation
(building on the 1997 UN International Study on Firearm Regulation); best practices
including approaches to legislation, community based initiatives, and enforcement.
l Encourage countries to establish uniform standards for data collection and reporting
regarding SALW used and recovered in crime and violence.
l Share new technological approaches to record-keeping, tracing and destruction.
l Encourage countries to collect information regarding illicit trafficking in their area and 
to provide Interpol with regular updates for the International Weapons and Explosives
Tracking System (in order to facilitate cooperation and monitoring of the global problem).
In order to ensure the development and full implementation of comprehensive legislation and
governing domestic regulation of civilian SALW, the UN 2001 Conference should establish
procedures for follow-up and regular international review of progress in this area. This should
include assessment of the implementation of measures at the global, regional and national
level based upon regular and detailed information exchange on the part of all states and
should incorporate consultations with relevant sectors of civil society that are concerned with
preventing the proliferation and misuse of SALW. The progressive development of norms,
standards and legislation to control civilian SALW should also be promoted through formal
review of the implementation of the UN Conference Programme of Action, which should take
place no later than 2004/2005.
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